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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
Customary international 
law identification as 
constrained law-making
A response to David Koppe
There has been a resurgence of interest in recent years in 
how customary international law is identified, and this 
interest will likely intensify as a result of the International 
Law Commission’s current work on the subject. Somewhat 
ironically, this resurgence of interest comes at a time when 
there are increasing doubts about the continued usefulness 
of customary international law in addressing the world’s 
problems, and about whether the traditional doctrinal tests 
for customary international law need to be reconsidered. 
These doubts, and potential responses to them, are 
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considered in a forthcoming book that I have edited, 
Custom’s Future: International Law in a Changing World.
The blog post on “Ascertaining customary international law” 
suggests that the identification of norms of customary 
international law involves a ‘process of rhetoric’. I tend to 
agree, but I think this insight can be taken further.
No customary law, including customary international law, 
exists in the abstract. There may be customary practices, but 
they do not operate in a self-liquidating manner to produce 
law. Even when customary law is identified inductively 
(which is often not the case), it requires an interpreter to, 
among other things, characterize the relevant practice at a 
particular level of generality. That characterization 
inevitably is affected by considerations outside of the 
inductive enterprise, including consequentialist 
considerations about the impact on states of particular 
formulations.
Many efforts to identify customary international law are not 
inductive at all, and, contrary to what debates about “old” 
versus “new” custom might suggest, this is not a new 
phenomenon. Legal disputes between states often arise 
precisely because there is no clear practice on point, either 
because the practice in question is new, conditions have 
changed in a way that alters the benefits or burdens of a 
particular practice, or there was no previous need to 
determine whether the practice had legal status. In these 
situations, discerning customary international law does not 
involve the application of settled norms of practice followed 
out of a sense of legal obligation. Instead, it involves, for 
example, appeals to general principles or baselines that 
purportedly have widespread acceptance, and a contention 
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that those principles or baselines have particular 
implications for the context at hand.
There is, in other words, a substantial amount of creativity in 
the identification of norms of customary international law. 
To put it differently, the interpretation of customary 
international law is, in part, a law-making, and not merely 
law-identifying, exercise. This means that, despite applying 
purportedly similar standards, different institutional actors 
are likely to identify norms of customary international law 
differently. There is simply no such thing as “customary 
international law” divorced from an interpretive and 
institutional context. The law-making aspect to the 
identification of customary international law also means, as I 
have suggested elsewhere, that the identification of 
customary international law by international courts is likely 
to resemble the judicial development of the common law:   
that is, an approach whereby adjudicators look to past 
practice but necessarily make choices about how to describe 
it, which presumptions to apply in evaluating it, and whether 
and when to extend or analogize it to new situations.
This does not mean that there are no constraints on the 
creative aspects of the identification of customary 
international law. Ultimately, appeals to customary 
international law depend on a certain level of acceptance in 
the international community. As a result, interpreters who 
stray too far from state preferences (including about what is 
considered socially and morally desirable) are likely to be 
ineffectual and may even generate a backlash. This is likely 
one reason that interpreters often rely heavily on widely-
ratified treaties as evidence of customary international law: 
the treaties are evidence that particular norms have 
substantial international support. International courts also 
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face other constraints, such as the constraints associated 
with the adjudicative process itself (including jurisdictional 
restrictions), the expectation of a certain type of public 
reasoning, and the heavy dependence of many of these 
courts on voluntary compliance.
Understanding the identification of customary international 
law as a type of constrained law-making rather than as 
something simply discerned based on the “two elements” of 
practice and opinio juris helps resolve a variety of 
conceptual and evidentiary puzzles. Perhaps most notably, it 
helps resolve the famous “chronological paradox,” pursuant 
to which it is uncertain how rules of customary international 
law can form if they can exist only when a practice is already 
followed out of a sense of legal obligation. The answer is 
that, in practice, the modern two element definition of 
customary international law does not in fact describe how 
norms of customary international law are identified. Of 
course, the two-element definition might be a useful fiction 
in addressing concerns about the legitimacy of customary 
international law, which is less consensual than treaty-
making, or about the discretion exercised by international 
adjudicators. But theorists of international law should be 
willing to recognize that it is, in fact, a fiction. The blog post
on “Ascertaining customary international law” is a step in the 
right direction.
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